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A Christian
Physician's Approach
To Dying

ølways attempt to share in some way with each bereaved
that W does not end ín death."

"I

family my conviction

By ROBERTJONES

A nhvsician received word that a close friend of his
ll;u; critically ill. But the physician was occupied

with important work and was therefore unable to
leave immediately for his friend's bedside. When he
finally arrived at his friend's home, the friend was
dead,

In this situation, a number of emotions must have
regret, or perhaps even grief or guilt at
surfaced

not being- able to be there sooner. But the overwhelming feeling was one of compassion for those
who also felt the loss.

We can read about this incident involving the

Great Physician ancl Lazarus in the eleventh chapter
of John.

Then Mary, when she came where Jesus was
and saw him, fell at his feet, saying to him,
'nLord, if you had been here, my brother would
not have died." When Jesus saw her weeping,
he was deeply moved in spirit and troubled; ancl
Dr. Robert Jones is Associate Professor of Surgery in the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery ât tlìe Duke University Mcdical Center' A graduate of
Harding University, he is â deacon in the Cole Mill Road Church of Christ,
Durham, North Carolina.

he said, "Where have you laid him?" They said
to him, "Lord, come and see." Jesus wept. So
the Jews said, "See how he loved him!"
Then Jesus, deeply moved again, came to the
tomb; it was a cave, and a stone lay upon it.
Jesus said, "Take away the stone." Martha,
the sister of the dead man, said to him, "Lord,
by this time there will be an odor, for he has
been dead four days." Jesus said to her, "Did I
not tell you that if you would believe you would
see the glory of God?" So they took away the
stone. And Jesus . . . cried with a loud voice,
"Lazarus, come out." The dead man came out,
his hands and feet bound with bandages, ancl
his face wrapped with a cloth. Jesus said to
them, "Unbind him, and let him go."

There is

a great deal of difference

between the

of physicians today and the capabilities
of this Great Physician. But there is nonetheless
much that we can learn from studying Jesus'
encounter here in a situation of death. Woven
through this entire story are two main prineiples;

capabilities
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Jesus' compassion and his active intervention in the
situation.
Compassion

For Martha, Jesus had words regardir-rg the
resurrection. For Mary, the emotional one, Jesus
wept. This word, weep, connotes a deep

and

overwhelming sorrow which can hardly be expressed,
which often convulses one in quiet crying. The fact
that Jesus wept reflects his compassional.e character
in this siutation of death.

|.lo medical doctor is worthy of the role of

physician if he has not at some time in his life wept at
the time of a patient's cieath. A physician who is also
a Christian must have an extra measure of love for
his fellow man and feel deep empathy in these times
of loss. Often this compassion will be serene and
calm, but sometimes it will be demonstrated in other,
equally important ways.
I recall one family that became enraged and guiltridden at the announcement of the death of a child.
The family members began to fight and to threaten
the lives of one another. This forced me to call the
security agents of the hospital and to have some of
them removed. This was an act of compassion and
love.

My wife, who is a nurse, relates an incident
involving a gentleman dying with terminal renal
disease who had alienated himself from his family by
his lifestyle and who had very few visitors. But as
death grew nearer, one evening he called my wife to
his side and, from his few possessions, took a dollar
bill and gave it to her. Her first response, as a
professional person, wâs to give it back
but then
- her
she understood that he was now claiming
as his
only family and was giving her an inheritance. He
died later that night. Accepting the dollar also was an
act of compassion. In each unique and specific

to feelings of loss experienced by the family.
A period of grief is necessary for each physician

who loses a patient. Experiencing this grief is
important and reflects appropriate sensitivity.
However, it is equally important that a physician not
be overcome with grief and lose effectiveness with
the family and with his other patients. I permit
myself only twenty-four hours to grieve following the
loss of a patient. At the end of that time, I state to
myself that the period of grief is over. I must now
turn to the living ancl renew my efforts for those
who need my help.

Intervention and Action

In his encounter with f,azarus, Jesus performed
the one action which they all desired
- the return of
the health of their loved one. Unfortunately, those of
us who are physicians today do not share this
ultimate capability to heal. We frequently fail in our
endeavors. Nevertheless, it is important that our
healing efforts reflect a high level
and competence.

of professional skill

Competent Practice. Cornpetent practice involves
our patients, and the families of our

ourselves,

patients. The physician must constantly remind
himself of the great responsibility that patients
entrust to him. When I find myself holding the heart
of a patient who is on the bypass machine for support
of his body, and his heart is still while it is being
repaired, I see all the mass of technology for this
sleeping patient and understand how precarious his
life really is, At such times, I am overwhelmed by the
amount of confidence the patient has placed in me,
his physician, and I can think of nothing worse than
to betray that confidence.

The practice of medicine is not easy. It

is

consistently demanding, and none of us is a perfect
physician. But it is imperative that each physician be
conscientious regarding his responsibility to maintain

"No medical doctor ís worthy of the role ûf his professional eclucation and his skills, and
physiciøn if he has not at some time in his particularly to avoid laziness
laziness *
- plain
which
is
the
most
common
cause
of
inappropriate
lìfe wept at the time of a patient's death""
patients.
treatment

situation, Christians in health care must reach forth
from hearts that are sensitive and lull of compassion.
In the selection of medical students, I often have

wished that we had an index of sensitivity, for
sensitivity to the needs of others can rarely be taught.
It is axiomatic that a Christian, who regards each
person as a precious individual before God, will be
sensitive in every situation, compassionate, and
anxious to help.

A physician who experiences the death of a patient
commonly feels frustration and failure when he fails.
Even though he may have done everything humanly
possible, the physician bears this burelen in additir:n
4

of
In addition, as the physieian cares for the critically
ill, and particularly the terminally ill patient, he must
consistently on a regular basis examine his diagnosis
and treatment to be certain that it is as accurate and
as precise as possible. When there is reasonable
question concerning alternate forms of therapy, he
should consult the opinions of others.
After death occurs, it is imperative that each
physician review the details of the treâtment and
assess retrospectively what alterations might have
been made and to judge honestly whether those
alterations might have affected the outcome, Only
through helnest and eonsistent reviev¿ can an
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individual physician enhance his skills by lessons of'
experience.

Cqndor with Íhe Patient. Another important task

of the physician is to inform a patient of

a

threatening illness in a way that preserves a balance
between honesty and hope. A physician should never

be deceitful in giving information regarding the
possible outcome of a potentially lethal disease.
Rather, the truth should be told in a compassionate
and thoughtful way and in a situation which

"Each patient should be granted

some
illnesses
that
are
for
physician
never has
rarely cured. ,4
suffícíent ínsight to know which patient will
be the unusual pstient who will live beyond
reasonable expectãtíons, or whích partícular
diøgnosis may eventually prove incorrect."

degree oJ' hope, even

optimally communicates a balance of rational

concern and reasonable hope to the patient. The
outdated practice of telling patients that a certain
period of time is left f'or them, or that there is no
hope, is neither medically accurate nor appropriately
compassionate. Rather, each patient should be
granted some degree of hope, even for illnesses that
are rarely cured. One never has sufficient insight to
know which patient will be the unusual patient who

I recall operating on a patient wiLh a mass in the
lung. The patient was told prior to the operation that
there was a very good chance that this mass might be
cancer. Following the oper:ation, I told his wife, "l'm
very sorry, but it was malignant." Her response to
trìe was, "Doctor, he's going to die, isn't he?" I
replied, "Yes, but so are you. "
Many families tend to overprotect or avoid the
farnily member who is ill to an irrational degree, and
it is the important task of a physician to prevent this
from happening. It is genuinely tragic when patients
involute into a terminal phase of illness, waiting for
the approach of death rather than using whatever
time remains to make a life that is as full and as rich
will permit.
Prolonging Life, As death approaches, the

as the disease

physician has a special responsibility to the family to
be certain that they are awale that appropriate but

not unduly heroic measures are being taken. With
modern technology, it is almost always possible to
prolong life for seconds, minutes, days, frequently
weeks, or maybe even years. 'Ihe time of death then
becomes a time of decision that is controlled to some
degree by physician involvement. This realization can

become a great burden for a physician who knows
that he cannot affect the ultimate outcome, but that
he might alter, to some degree, the Íiming of the
outcome of the disease.

In

such

a situation, the most loving action

the

will live beyonel reasonable expectations, ol which
unfavorable diagnosis may eventually prove

physician can perform is to accept the responsibility
to make the appropriate decisions to provide only a

incorrect.

reasonable amount

A

physician should respect the dignity of each
patient and should never strip him of this dignity

during this last important event of his life. A
physician should never regard any patient as a
number or as a diagnosis. Even a patient who
becomes hooked to a large amount of technology,
who looks like an object who is continuous with the
objects around him, should always remain an
individual with a soul who is mother, father, loved
one, or friend.
Working with the Family. In telling families of an
unpleasant diagnosis, or in situations where large risk
Iooms, honesty and hope are the two components
important to communicate"
Most of us feel so immortal that we fail to realize
that each of us has a rendezvous with cleath. When
sorneone near us is given information that suggests

his death might be reasonably more imminent than
before, the tendency is to treat that individual as if
somehow suddenly unique. But I think it is very
important to emphasize to families that none of us
has a guarantee of tomorrow and that they and the
patient should vigorously exploit each minute we are
given by living a full life.

of treatment, and to

avoid

placing the burden of grief and guilt associated with
decisions to limit therapy upon the family. Although
in some situations the physician may choose to
involve the family in these decisions, he cannot
escape the ultimate lesponsibility for them.
When Death Comes. At the time of death the

"The physiciøn should acknowledge to the
family that death is paínful ünd that there ís
no e&sy way to recover quíekly from the loss
of a loved one.e'
physician should provide sì.lpport by sharing the grief

with the family. He should acknowledge to

the

family that death is painful and that there is no easy
way to recover quickly from the loss of a loved one.
All families at the time of death feel some degree
of guilt which may relate to specific actions they had
failed to clo or suppose were done improperly in
times past. More commonly, the guilt is vague and
may be related to specific aspects of the health care

given during the illness. It is important for the
physician to assuage tlris guilt by informing the
family that everything necessary to provide an
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opportunity for recovery has bser"r done, and to
reassure the family of the appropriateness of' the
care. In these discussions, it is important to admit
that no aspect of human endeavor is completely
perfect, including health care delivery.
There commonly are specific needs that must be
met at this time. Some family members and friends
need tranquilizing medication to aid sieep fol several

days. Frequently, an initial period of shock and
distraction from reasonable questions will extend for
several days or weeks after the death. I often tell my
patients to call me a week or two after the funeral if
they need to talk. Talking about details of the

J'or my patients, I pray
csre J'or them, und I prøy for

"I pray J'requently

for myself ss I

terms intermittently throughout this man's operation
that he be granted life and that God would direct rne
and my decisions and actions. But for the very first
time, I prayed specifically, "God, please get this man
off the table, for I cannot." And he came off the
heart-lung machine and recovered to walk out of the
hospital. He lived for a month but died suddenly one
night while enjoying a television program.
When we become fervent with God in a specific
way, he will hear us as he has promised. llut perhaps
we need to be cautious and careful in our specific
requests. We simply c1o not have sufficient wisdom to

know what God has planned for the lives of

individuals we treat as patients.

us who share the Christian hope is our belief in
eternal life which extends beyond this life. I always
attempt to share in some way with each bereaved
family my conviction that life does not end in death.
I find that most share in this belief and find it to be a
great comfort at the time of death and bereavement.
The Resource of Prayer. In all these situations, we
must remember the power of prayer. "For the
fervent, effectual prayer of a lighteous rnan avails
much." I pray frequently for my patients. I pray for
myself as I care for them, and I pray for their

Conclusion
A physician is plivileged to witness and participate
in the cycle of life and death. This privilege is obvious
in pleasant times such as the birth of a baby that is
always miraculous, and when those who are diseased
recover, It is a more sober but serene privilege to
witness death, and to be reminded that it is appointed
unto man once to die. Each time I have witnessed
death, I have experienced a new zeal for living, for
the coìor of flowers, for the touch of my child's
hand. And whoever witnesses the death of another
cannot but thank God for the life that he has lying
ahead, and for the lives of those whom he loves,
It is a special privilege for a Christian physician to
witness death because he understands that the soul
which God created to live within man was not meant
to be forever imprisoned in this imperfect world, but

families.

was

their families."
terminal event provides a degree of relief from the
sorrow of some families.
But perhaps the most unique resource for those of

I pray in many

ic ways. Oue incident
of mine with whom I had

specif

occurred with a patient
become particularly close. This very fine man was

a

Christian who had severe coronary artery disease and
who underwent a bypass operation. At the time of
the operation, we found his arteries to be much more
diseased than we could have anticipated from earlier
studies, and it was not possible to do much to help
the extensive disease in his heart. After completion of'
the bypass, his heart was too weak to support his
circulation. Despite many medicines, many hours of
effort, and many devices designed to help the failing
heart, all seemed to be lost. I had prayed in general

þfitde

¡ú r¿nde¡"

s

to be freed by death for the more perfect

for which man was created. We then can
concur with Paul who exulted,
existence

"Death is swallowed up in victory,

"

"O death, where is thy victory?
O death, where is thy sting?"
The sting ol'death is sin, and the power of sin
is the law. But thanks be to God, who gives us
the victory through oul Lord Jesus Christ.

Therefore, my beloved brethren,

be

steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the
work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your
labor is not in vain. (I Cor. I5;54-58,)

bushe/P Nmf

Instead, share Mission Journal with a t'riend. Use
the enclosed card in the center o/ fhis issue, and
we will see to it that your t'riend receiues a sample
copv snd an inuítation to subscribe.

JM$ffi\
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h/edical Ëthics
and the Care of
Dying Per$ons

"Dying patients should be granted the freedom to respond as they wish after
they høve heurd the recommendations and counsels of medical professionels."
By IIAROLD Y. VANDERPOOL

notable subject areas which have generatecl years. Contemporary society is marked by religious,
T*o
I special attention within organized medicine in the ethnic, and cultural pluralism. Thus, moral
last decade are medical ethics and the care of dying
persons. Yet what is the mysterious creature named

"medical ethics, " and is the interest in ethics
somehow related to the concern and controversy over

terminal care?

these questions.

I will

seek here

to explore both of

Definition of Medical Ethics
Medical ethics is best defined not as a unique, or
uniquely noble, set of ethical principles honored by
medical professionals, but as a specific version of
general ethical inquiry. It represents a careful
scrutiny of medical judgements and instructions
according to principles of ordinary moral discourse
and reasoning. We must therefore seek to define
,4.

medical ethics by asking what the discipline of ethics
is, then ask how it is related to medical practice
- in
this instance, the care of dying persons,
Philosophical ethics is a body of learning which
seeks to discover general, universal principles of
morality upon whieh reasonable persons ean agree"
This search for common moral principles explains in
part why ethics has become so popular in recent
Harold Vanderpool is an A,ssociate Professor in thc History and Philosophy
of Medicine at the University of 'I cxas Mcdical ìlranch jn Galvcslon, 'Iexas.

philosophers who seek to discover a consensus of
opinion regarding which medical actions are right or
wrong are performing an extremely important task.

This search for common understandings of

morality may be interesting and even admirable, but
does it have any clout? Does the discipline of ethics
really deal with issues which are basic to the human
condition, or is it a set of noble ideals, packaged in
twenty-five cent words, which people would like to
honor, but somehow suspect that they cannot or will
not? A physician, Joan Gomez, once remarked that
"a moral veto is no good against an instinctual
drive." This makes moral reasoning nice, but hardly
powerful.
In response to this suspicion, however, it can be
argued that peoplc constantly shape their political
programs, public policies, business elealings, legal
codes, and even justifications for religious belief and
behavior by ethical presumptions and ethical modes
of reasoning. Further, these assumptions are often
just that: assumptions. Thus, policies aird decisions
often "float" on a sea of ethieal assuming which is

never explored. (Cf. R.alph B. Fotter, War snd Moral
Discourse, Riehmond: John Knox Press, 1966.)

Consider,

for

example, religious beliefs. Some
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sermons, radio progranrs, and religious tracts argue
that we ought to go to church, do missionary work,
or not drink alcohol in order to avoid punishment in

hell. Others disagree with this emphasis

on

punishment and emphasize that deep religious faith
and regular church attendance are important because
they contribute to human fulfillment and happiness.

In either case the reasons or justifications for
religious commitment are hedonistic, whereby the
right or good is equal in meaning to that which

"Kline znd Sobin recommended that

physícÌuns rnust tell líes ancl white-lies and
¡tlay elaborate social garnes in order to lcee¡t
their ¡tatients from catastrophic hnrm."
pain and increases pleasure. Yet many
persons who consider themselves religious believe
that people should not do things primarily because of
pleasure; for in the name of personal pleasure
decreases

humans indulge in a thousand vices. Ironically, then,

of hedonism may
unknowingly be hedonists, themselves.
The point is simply that underneath justilications
for religious fervor are ethical positions which can be
"teased oLlt" and criticized for their logical
many who are highly critical

coherence. The same applies lor political programs,
health-related policies, and so on.
We are now able to set forth a brief' and clear
definition of ethics as a human enterprise. Ethics is
simply a discipline which seeks to make expliciÍ those

presumptions about rightness and wlongness,
goodness and badness, which otherwise remain
merely implicit. Then the strengths and weaknesses
of these prsumptions can be assessed. For example, is
hedonism logically coherent, or does it wind up in a
circular argument? Does it square with what we
know about human character? Does it lead to good
consequences?

In order to elaborate on the notion that ethical
presumptions and,/or principles are funclamental to
the texture of human life and to medicine

particularly, and to provide ourselves with a
background for discussing how ethics should
influence terminal care, let us look at the
recommendations regarding the care of cancer'
patients by Nathan S" Kline and Julius Sobin
(lournal of the American Medical Association,
Augrrst 25,1951, pp. 1547-1551).
'llerminal Care with Ðthics as [m¡rlicÍt

Doctors Kline and Sobin began by saying that
when they were in medical school, almost no
attention was given to the psychological and social
dimensions of patient care. They were trained simplv
to "help the patient adjLrst 1o his eondition" and
8

were

left to figure out the how's, why's,

and

wheref'ore's of this care as they went along. They
wrote their article in order to make up for this failure
to address the specific needs of terminally ill cancer
patients.

Kline and Sobin observed that whereas cancer had
hardly been discussed in America before they began
to practice medicine, now it had become the subject
of a wide-spread educational campaign. This
campaign, however, gave rise to a national "cancer
phobia, " which causes patients to be terribly
traumatized when they hear of their diagnosis. Thus,
some patie nts ref'use to believe the pirysician's
diagnosis; others become sever:ely de¡rressd; others
become psychotic and lose touch with reality; most

ate sorely tempted to commit suicide;

some
experience complete physical collapses and retuln to
states of infantile helplessness; and still others

develop counter-phobias and act

like nothing

is

wrong.
Because of these scarey and painful reactions,
Kline and Sobin recommended that physicians must
tell lies and white-lies and play elaborate social games
in order to keep their patients from catastrophic
harm. For example, most patients should be told that
they have "a type of stomacl't ulcer," or "a liver
disfunction," instead of being told that they have a
form of cancer. The entire medical staff should
perpetuafe this l'alsehood, and each patient's family
should be counseled to keep the llorrible news from
their loved ones. Relatives should not cry in front of
those who are l-rospitalized, nor should they express
regret about how they had treated them in the past.
In case family members are put on the spot by
patients asking them about what their doctors had
said, Kline and Sobin suggest the following: "I am

",A.lthough medicine rightly places great
value upon the extensÌon o.Í' human life,
healtk csre proJ'essíonals have no right to
seek to coerce patients to extend their lives
ttc

ca r

d in g t a sp

ec

iJ'íe rne clíc

ai

th

er *¡t íe s.

"

not telling you that he has cancer, so you can be
perfectly honest in denying that I said he had cancer,
if he does insist on knowing what I say." They add
that it is "surprising how helpful such a worcling of
the diagnosis can be to relatives" !
Kline ancl Sotrin suggestecl other procedures for the

care of cancer patients. Anytime the medical
conditions of patients are cliscussecl, patients are to
be told stror-igly that it is their obligation to receive
scientifie meclical treatment. Patients also are to be
carefuily watchecl ancl managed lest they seek
unorthoclox medical therapy, and they should be
kept from turning to religior,rs experiences whieh are

,4U(;U.t7', Ì98t

radicaliy different from ¡:rior orientations. They
finally should be given pain reliel' anci should be
encouraged to remain as active as possible in their
present jobs
or to develop new hobbies which

-

interest them.
Although these physicians never mentioned ethics

or values and likely believed that

their

recommendations were based on the latest psychological theory and medical facts, their discussion was
loaded with ethical presumptions and judgments.

. Let us now critically asess these
ethical presuppositions.
Before beginning this task, I shoulcl remark that
been made explicif

because we are looking at tlte ethics of Kline and
Sobin, we will assume that their empilical theories

and factual data are correct. It is

nevertheless

important to observe that many of the "facts" which

they

assume

d to be correct were false

exaggerated. Much recent work

and

on the nature

ol'

human grief and the grief process has undermined

many of the presuppositions of Kline and Sobin
about how the great rnajority cannot cope with their'
grief . We cannot at this point survey present thinking

First, they believed that physicians are morally
obligated not to harm patients with the medical
treatment they provide; and since diagnosis is part of "llh¡tsiç¡¡¡ns hctve no right to determine how
modern medicine, the diagnosis itself must not
respond relígíousll) or whether
produce harm. Therefore, because a diagnosis of adults should
should
be able to try unarthodox
they
cancer can produce psychological harm, Kline and
medical therøpy."
Sobin justified lying, white-lying, and game-playing
with patients and family members. They were willing
the grieving process, but simply observe that it
to endure the possible rebukes ìrurled at them for about
is crucially significant in the care of cancer patients.
being liars on the grounds of tlie ultimate good of not
These new data would require Kline and Sobin to
harming patients. Their policy of protecting patients
particularly as it
rewrite much of' their article
from harm was extended to areas of non-medical relates to their
endorsement of- lying. Ilut this new
management: patients should be kept from seeking
information would not necessarily require them to
out unorthodox medical treatment and they should
change their other opinions and recommendations.
be carefully monitored lest they turn to some strange
However
or intense form of religious commitment.
- assuming that they are correct about
the traumatizing effects o{'grief, I believe that Kline
Second, Kline and Sobin believed that physiciarrs and Sobin's recommendations regarding lying,
must demonstrate their benevolent concern for the white-lying, and game-playing are justified! The
general well-being of their patients. Patients are to be psychotic breaks, compulsions toward suicide, and
assisted in maintaining self-respect and ordinary total collapses feared by Kline and Sobin represent
identity, like being encouraged to continue in their catastrophic harms from which individuals shoulcl be
occupations and to maintain their f amily protected. I am reminded of the classic case of a
relationships by being cared for at home if possible.
German lamily hiding Jewish citizens in the basement
or attic during the Nazi regime. Should the Gestapo
Third, these writers believed in the duty of come to the door asking whether
Jewish families
extending humøn life as long as possible. They thus were
being hidden, most of us would agree that it
believed that patients must be convinced that it is would
be justifiable to lie
with words, with facial
their duty to receive chemical therapy, surgery, or expressions, and with body- language. This does not
long
as
radiation in order to extend their lives as
mean that lying is a virtue. Rather, the duty ol' not
possible.
lying is viewed here as one of several moral "claims"
Finally, Kline and Sobin felt obligated Ío prevent which must be played of'f against other claims, like
patients from harming others. They must therefore that of preventing harm and possible death,
Further, I agree with a number of the benevolent
control or "manage" patients so that they will not
upset or cause injury to themselves, their families, or ÇonÇerns 1'or the general well-being of patients as
to others in the hospital. They wrote that if patients expressecl by Kline and Sobin. Self-respect and wellbecome so preoccupied with their diseases that they being ean be maintaineel and enhanced if patients can
make life miserable for themselves and others, they keep their jobs as long as possible ancl be cared for at
(Cf. Vanderpool, "The Ethics of Terminal
should be given prefrontal lobotomies
- which home.
preoccupation
Care," Journal of the Americal Medicql Associotion,
usually results, in "the loss of
February 27,19'18, pp. 850-852.)
with self ancl future. "
Vlany of their positions, however, present serious
moral problems. First, although medicine rightly
Ethical Critique.
The first task identified above has now been done: places great value upon the extension of human life ,
the irnplicit ethical values of Kline a¡ld Sobin have health care professionals have no right to seek to
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co€rce patients to extencl their lives according to
specific medical therapies. llven the Roman Catholic
Church, which places such great emphasis on the
preserving and extending of human biological life,
recognizes that life-prolonging procedures are not

treatment of' others necessitates having respect for
Lhe privale, interior, and individual dimensions of

human existence. This lecognizes persons

as

autonomous and deserving cerfain rights. Such an

approach is greatly indebted to the work of
they conflict with other highly valued Immanuel Kant, who argued that human morality is
human concerns including the financial well-being of predicated upon a respect lor persons as individuals
families, the right of the patient to remain at home, who can define their own ends and purposes. But to
and the avoidance of both debilitation and force another human to conform to rny values is to
mutilation. Individuals should be able to live use him as an instrument or a thing rather than to
according to the fundamental values which serve to value him to the degree that he is able to define his
define who they are as social and psychological own private course of action. I have no logicol
creatures. The desire of Jehovah's Witnesses to grounds for claiming that I should be able to define
refuse blood transfusions is a classic example of this my own ends unless I grant this freedom to others.
point of view.
This is a strong, persuasive point of view in that it
Second, although physicians are obligated to appears to be logical and true. lt takes us far beyond
protect patients as much as possible from the mere opinion and gut reactions in ethics.
harmful effects of their rnedical interventions, they
This philosophical framework accents indiviclual
have no right to determine how adults should rights. It means that morally acceptable acts are
respond religiously or whether they should be able to based upon the permission or consent of others, and
try unorthodox medical therapy. Kline and Sobin this permission and consent place moral timits on the
neglected to focus on rights, in this case the right of degree to which humans can intrude into the affairs
the individual to define his own relationship to God of others. These limits are formalized by contracts,
and his fellow believers, and his right to try unusual either implicit or explicit, verbal or written. This
framework of moral discourse highlights the positive
remedies for any number of reasons.
Finally, although patients might at times disturb notions of self-determination and freedom, and these
others to the point of causing emotional injury, it is notions are strongly preserved and protected in
outrageous that prefrontal lobotomies were viewed British-American law.
This mode of reasoning influences the care of
as a means of preventing such injury. In this
instance, a general concern for the peaceful well- terminally ill persons in several ways. First, it calls
being of others becomes a justification for severely for the fundamental right of each patient to be
informed about the possible harms and benefits of
altering a patient's mentality and awareness.
scientific medical therapy, and emphasizes that each
patient must be granted the right to consent to these
Terminal Care with Ethics as Explicit
therapies and procedures before they are performed.
What are my own sources for these strong Second, informed consent
regarding medical therapy
reactions to Kline and Sobin? On one level, it is
is impossible without the patient's having the righl to
impossible to give a complete answer to this question,
know qs much as he wishes about medical diagnosis.
for these responses are indebted to such varied This
does not mean thal. information regarding
sources as Ameriean culture
"Give me liberty, or diagnosis
be forced upon the patient, for this is
give me death!"
s¡ the legacy of the biblical a form of must
coercion
which undermines the individual's
prophets.
autonomy. But patients should be offered a clear
On another level, however, the sources for these
choice about what they wish to know or not to know
reactions to Kline and Sobin are clearly identifiable
about diagnosis. Moral medical caring thus begins
with legacies of ethical inquiry which justify these
with the proposition that patients are private persons
Whereas the physíe ían - p$tient who should be respected as both free and selfrequired

if

"

reløtionship was ance chøracterized by
paternalistic care and nurture, it now
íncludes priv(tcy, üutonomy, snd sel.fdetermínatíon""
criticisms and eiemand that other guidelines for
terminal care be formulated. V/e shall look at two of
these legacies.
'I'he
emphasizes

first

l0

thc way in which the moral

directed.

Finally, this ethical tradition emphasizes that dying
patients shoulel be granted the freedom to respond as
they wish after they have heard the recommendations
and counsels of medical professionals. They can
refuse treatment, seek unorthodox medical cures,
and react in any number of religious ways, as long as

they do not harm others. (This tradition of moral
discourse means that patients cannot use others,
including physicians and nurses, for their ends.
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Health professionaìs also have rights which should be
honored and protected.)

A secr¡nd ethical legacy deals with the
psychological or communql tnatrix of personhood.
The legacy defines the moral relationship among
persons in terms of what is required for persons to be
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This ethical tradition also bears on care for dying
persons. lt regards as dulies certain actions which

nurtured and to achieve completeness. It assumes
that it is impossible to form and perpetuate a
community of persons which fosters personal
awareness, knowledge, and well-being without

clearly will benefit patients physically, psychoIogically, and socially. These inclucle the duty of
scientific medical compeÍence, the duty of attending
to both the physical and emotional needs of patients,
and the duty of enabling patients to meet certain
social needs, for example, the need to interact with
family and friends and to express, experience, and

adherring to certain fundamental moral prescriptions

share religious beliefs.

and prohibitions.

Other moral duties or obligations are required in
order for persons not to injure others. These include

Assurne, for example, that we are among seventyfive persons of many ages, backgrounds, and levels

of coTf:tence YT 11: lgfl al sel T9 blowl ofl
"Moral medícal caring begins with the
proposítion that patients üre private persons
who should be respected as both free ønd
self-dllected.
course for many days. We find ourselves marooned
on a tropical island totally cut off from the rest of the
world. What fundamental moral norms will we
establish for ourselves in order for us to be protected

and nurtured socially and psychologically? What
moral norms are essential in order to keep our
existence from becoming the nightmare of crippling
relationships described in William Golding's novel,
Lord 0f the Flies?
A number of ethical norms or "rules" can be
identified as morctl prerequisites for social and
psychological personhood. These include such moral
"rules" as truth-telling, refraining from stealing or

killing, maintaining some form of justice, and
encouraging beneficence (loving) and nonmalevolence (preventing and removing evil.) This
ethical tradition focuses not primarily on the rights
of individuals, but on the duties or obligations of all

who wish to preserve or enhance communal
personhood. The preserving of the rights of
individuals emerges as ore of several duties or
obligations.

The type of moral awareness which arises out of
this social or communal framework of meaning has a

It is evident, for example, in the
of the Hebrews as they escaped from

lengthy history.

actions

In the wilderness of Sinai they
of moral principles which we now
identify as the Ten Commandments. Similar to the
first ethical tradition above, this perspective seeks to
understand ethical principles not as subjective
hunches but as right, true, and necessary if we agree
that we wish to live in a community that will meet
human needs and some human wants. (Cf. Arthur J.
Dyek, On Humçn Care, ldashville: Abingdon Press,
Egyptian bondage.
agreecl upon a set

refraining from lying, mutilation, and killing.
Philosophers like the Englishman W.D. Ross have

argued that these principles should not be thought of
as hard and fast rules which must always be taken
into consideration, even though at times one of these
principles, like not harming, can justifiably over-rule

another, like truth-telling. (W.D. Ross, The Right
and the Good, Oxford: Claringdon Press, 1930.)
Explicit Versus Implicit Values
Some of the reasons for may agreements and

with the recommendations of Kline
and Sobin are now apparent. My agreements are
associated with their implicit appreciation of certain
communal dimensions of personhoocl. Kline and
Sobin correctly sought to protect patients from
traumatic psychological harm
- although, as noted
earlier, a decade of research on the psycho-dynarrics
of grief now indicates that the harms which they
envisioned were greatly exaggerated. They also
recognized the moral value of benevolent concern for
patients and family
- particularly how physicians
can aid and nurture patients when they assist them in
disagreements

remaining as active as possible when they assist them

in

remaining as active as possible and make it

possible for them to associate with family and friends
in and out of the hospital.

Yet other communal dimensions of human
morality were neglected ancl undermined by Kline
and Sobin. Showing little concern for the actual
communities out of which their patients came, Kline
and Sobin became the self-appointecl guardians of
psychosocial personhood. They assumed that they
could dictate which forms of religious expression
were legitimate or illegitimate, which expressions of
pain and grief were allowable and not allowable, and
precisely which forms of medical therapy may or may
not be utilized. Kline and Sobin reflected the

dominant values of a specific medieal subcommunity ancl were unaware of the eiegrees to
which the communal needs and values of their
patients may have conflicted with medical values.
This is seen, for example, in the differenees between

II

itlL\.\ION .tOIIRNtt

t

Roman Cathoiic views of tl're prolongation of lil'e atrd
thosc of Klinc and Sobin.

according to prescribed rnedical therapies. They are
not given the choicc of knowing or not knowing ol
their diagnoses (and having to live with the
consequences.) They are neither allowed to choose
alternative courses of medical therapy, nor allowed
to chart their religious futures. Without a knowledge
of diagnosis and prognosis, they are not even able to
settle their financial affairs or plan how they will
spend their final days.
The moral significance of the autonomy and rights
of the individual has surfaced with great power in the
last decade in America. This ethical framework either
reflects or has caused a profound shift to occur in the

They furthermore failed to take into consideration
fundamental moral prerequisites of social and
psychological personhood other than the duties of
not harming, truth-telling, and beneficence. For
example, they overlooked the value of justice, which
requires that rights, benefits, and even injuries be
distributed. Kline and Sobin were willing to injure
certain patients severely in order to spare other
members of the community (family members,
hospital personnel, and other patients in the ward)
from all pain or discomfort. Peace and quiet for all
would be bought at the price of prefrontal physician-patient relationship. Whereas this relationship was once characterized by paternalistic care and
lobotomies for a select few.
'lhese are serious oversights, but no more serious nurture, it now inclucles privacy, autonomy, and selfor tragic than the failure of Kline and Sobin to determination. The article by Kline and Sobin thus
consider the moral significance of personal privacy exemplifies not only the problems which occur when
and self-determination. Rather than being able to medical ethics are implicit rather than explicit, but
define their ends according to their own definitions, also the dramatic changes which have occurred in the
patients were to have their ends "fixed" by physician-patient relationship in recent limes.
/t4lffþN
physicians. Patients nrust prolong their lives

GRIEFGROWTH

Grief
is a journey
into the past and back again
into the present and out ogain
into hopes for a clearer future and back again
into the inner core of personhaod and out again
in and out, in and out, in ønd out, in and out,
seørchin g, feeling, examining, denying,
remernbering, hurting, yeørning,
underst andin q, sccep
growtng"

t
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g
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GRIEF"

A Frccess
W¡th a
Furpcse

"Somewhere in the remembering and the feeling,

we

find meaning in the death."

Edilor',s Note: The impetus for lhis (trticle was a
presentation hy fhe aufhor in April, 1979, al Park
Central Hospilal, Springfidd, Misst¡uri, as parl of a
series on Chrislian counseling.

By IIEBBCCA I,'OSTBR

tT
I

o say that deatl-r is mishandled in our society is an

understatement. We use euphemisms

like "in

trattsitiott," "interruption," ol' "passing" when we
speak of death. Some have their bodies frozen
following death, hoping to be restored to life at a
future time, We shield our children from the
deathscene by discouraging their presence at
funerals. In short, we use every conceivable gimmick
to avoid facing up to death's reality.
ln the long-run, each time we deny death or any
other fundamental Ìoss, we shortchange ourselves
through our failure to come to terms with our grief.

All ol us have experienced grief in some way. As
children, we may have lost a pet and mourned the
loss. As youths, we may have lost the affection of a
teacher or friend and yealned for that relationship.
As adults, we may have lost a job, we may have seen
our house destroyed by fire or storm, or we may have
movecl away from family and friends. In instances
such as these, we experience the pangs of separatiou
Rebecca lìoster is a caseworker
Services, Springl'ield, Mìssouri,

for lhe Grcene County L)ivision of Fanlilv

and the momentary loss of identity.'
The point is: we grieve each time we lose. And it is
important to work through our grief rather than deny
it that is, to allow a grief experience to come to a
thorough,
meaningful, and effective catharsis.

Griefwork
Some

of the

earliest studies

of griefwork in

the

United States were made by Dr. Eric Lindemann in
his treatmeut ol' l0l victims of the 1944 Cocoanut

Grove fire in Boston. His experiences with his
patients had such a plofound effect upon him that he
spent the remainder of his career as a psychiatrist
exploring the managernent of griel' and the care of
the bereaved, It was Lindcmann who coined the
term, "griefwork," and subsequently describecl its
function. He argued that there are three things to be
achieved through grief: (1) "emancipation from the
bondage to the deceased," (2) "readjustment to the
environmenl in which the deceased is missing," and
(3) "the formation of new relationships.

"'

Survivors commonly restructure the lasl. hours or
moments before a loved one's death searching for
t3
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guilt for failing to have done this or that.r So an
additional l'unction of griefwork is to help us resolve
any guilt related to our loss. In some instances, our
guilt feelings may be entirely vaiid. In others, they
may be neurotic, tirat is, basically unlounded and
unlealistic.
Some people

find it helpful to talk about guilt
feelings in order to separate normal guilt from
neurotic guilt, as well as to find release from the
misery and misunderstood emotions involved. In this
way, the functions of griefwork are set into motion.
We can then work to free ourselves from bondage to
the deceased and to establish new patterns of
interaction in our lives.
Pain is a common feeling in all grief experiences.
The pain of hurt brought on by loss is probably the
hardest kind of pain to handle and contains a mixture

of

memories
negative and positive memories
- process
of
which need review. "Mourning is the

bereaved commonly experience a
sense of unreality and emotional distunce
from other people."

"The

sorting out all the mernories of our loved one, of
reviewing each memory carefulìy and defining each
one in negative or positive ternrs," When we have
completed this task, then, we choose which memories
we wish to keep and to cherish and which we wish to
discard. Somewhere in the remembering and the
feeling, we find meaning in the death.a
Lindemann discovered numerous cases of delayed
grief among his patients. Some survivors were unable
to grieve at the time of death because of other preempting tasks or because of the necessity to maintain

the morale of others. Some of these patients

postponed their griefwork until an anniversary date
or until they reached the age of the person who had
died, or until they encountered another loss by
death.'

If we deny - that is, refuse to feel or to
grief
- we simply cannot do the work of
which is so vital to our physical and emotional well
being. Many who avoid griefwork become
remember

preoccupied with themselves and develop a kind of
protective selfl-pity. It is not uncomrrìon for suclr a
person to become distrusting toward others, to find
difficulty forming new relationships, and even to
experience alienation from old friends.
Stages of Grief

Still another element common to all

grief

experiences is the almost predictable progression of
griefwork from one stage of involvement to another.
Melba Colgrove, Harold Bloomfield, and Peter
McWilliams argue that there are three basic stages of

response

I4

to a loss.6 These are (l)

Shock/Denial,

(2) Aneer/Depression, and (3)
AÇceptance

Understanding,z

.

SÍage One, Shock/Denial, is cl-raracl.erized by the
theme of a death imprint. Survivors may feel
numbness, loss ol'vitality, physical illness, and
indelibìe images of the deceased, In some instances
an euphoric cclndition ol peace and strengtlt is
present. This condition may be so serene that the
bereaved may want to remain in that statc longer
than is possible or normal for this stage of grief
The state oJ'shock may last from a few hours to a
few days, depending upon the individual's needs.
Regardless of its duration, however, this stage serves
to anesthetize the pain of the loss and to aid the
bereaved through the death rituals. In the denial
¡rhase, the bereaved cor.nmonly experience a sense of
unreality and emotional distance from ottrer people.
If shock/denial continues for longer than several
days or a few weeks, it may be an indication that
grief is being mishandled and that griefwork is being
delayed. It is not wise for those comforting and
lending support to the bereaved to do things for them
longer than a few days. The sooner individuals begin
doing for themselves, the sooner they will get on with
their griefwork. If months pass and the bereaved are
still denying the death and are unable to talk about it,
professional help should be sought. The big hurdle in
this stage of grief is accepting the loss emotionally
when our inclination is not to believe it.
Støge Two, Anger/ Depression, is characterized by
themes of guilt, psychic numbing, and by a suspicion
of counterfeit nurturance from comforters. Feelings
of hostility, rage, and panic as well as lethargy and a
loss of motivation are common during this phase of
griefwork because the bereaved is struggling with
questions of dependence and autonomy. The grieving
person may tend to perceive help during this period
as a sign of his or her weakness.
The anxiety we all feel in this stage causes a
hollowness or emptiness of being. Guilt sometimes
overcomes us, loneliness overwhelms us, and
resentment pervades us. We may look at others with
skepticism; or we may blame Goel, doctors, or
anyone for our loss. We often have difficulty making
decisions and remembering things, and may even
feel we are going insane. ln our search for the
.

deceased, we may misperceive some sound or sight as
belonging to the dead person and momentarily feel
that our search has ended and that the deceased has
returned. Thoughts such as, "l've been deprived,"
"l feel a stigma," "I have no reason to live," are

Çommon.

It is a great temptation to mishandle grief during
this stage. We may âttempt to withdraw from others
and go further into our grief in order to eope" At
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times, we rnay even feel more comfortable with our
grief than without it, ancl therefore seek to keep it
alive rather than acljust to a new life. We may
become debilitated rather than empowered by our
anger. Vy'e may want to over-idealize the deceased. If
we find these things happeniirg to us or if we remain
in our anger,/depression state longer than sevelal
months, we likely shoulcl seek professional hclp.
The basic hurdle in this stage of grief is the open
expression of pain through the review of all negative
and positive feelings and memories. The memories
hurt, but it is through the hurt and the pain that we

find healing-not through the denial of hurt and
pain. The comfort-task of friends during this period
is to help keep the memory

of the deceased alive. It

is

irelpful to the bereaved when we speak the name of
the deceasecl, when we share the happy memories,

and when we show genuine concern and
unconditional acceptance.

Stage Three, Under,slanding/Acceptance,

is

characterized by a struggle for meaning. We begin to
affirm the reality that death is something with which
we must live. We realize that everything is not lost

after all, ancl we gradually sense a return of
motivation for living. We form a highly individual
meaning for the life of the deceased, and we view the
memories of our past relationship in terms ol' what
was learned or gained from it: we feel inspired by the
memory of the cleceased rather than burdened. We
no longer fear the real worlcl or close relations with
others. We feel free from bondage to the
cleceased-free enough to live again and, indeed, to
love again.

Yet, as we move from depression toward
understanding and acceptance, we realize we will
never stop remembering. There always will be a

"Guílt sometímes overcomes us, loneliness
overwhelrns ¿r& snd resentment pervades
TIS.

,
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prized place for the memory of our lost love. An
anniversary date or a sudden, unexpected memory of
the past will momentarily focus the deeeased in our
consciousness at various times for the remainder of

our life. Br¡t we are now able to handle

these

memories cffectively because of our prior griefwork
The hurdles in this slage of grief are twofoleì-to
harmonize the death rvith our emotions (specifically,
to emotionally bury the dead) and to accept the role
of change in our life. Perhaps the greatest challenge
of grief is that of being open to change. Accordingly,
"

this stage of grief may require several months for
eompletion. It is normal to resist change because the
many decisions, alterations, ancl new patterns of'
emotional conduct are threâtening to or¡l sense of

security. Our perspective or-r life clranges as a result of
our griefwork. Our feelings cl.range; we change. In
fact, we will never be tire same person that we were
before our grief experience. Being open to change
means that we are open to accepting the new person
we are becoining. lt is important to remember to be
patient with ourselves, to nurture our becoming, and
to give ourselves the needed time to adjust and to
make the neÇessary changes.

The comfort-task of friends and family during this
final phase of griefwork is to be accepting of the new
onThe

memories hurt, but it is through the
hurt and the pain that we.fincl healing."
person we see developing. Grief is hard for some
people to express
some just do not I'eel good about

- hand, sotne cry freely ancl feel
grieving. On the other
the release ol the hult. Still others need to talk about

their pain or go off alone and think. Crief is a
highly inciividual matl.er, and it is important for the
bereaved to be given the freedorn to express their hurt
in a manner that is natural to their personality.'
A final eletttenÍ commou to all gr,ief expcriclrccs
involving death has to do with coming to grips with
death's reality for ourselves. Somewhere amid pain,
guilt, and change, survivors of death usually own up
to tlieir own death, or at least give it some serious
thought. The importance ol'being open to death is
obvious: cleath becomes nanageable when we admit
ir.
It is natural for us to contemplate our own cleath
and even to experience a brief mourning period for
ourselves at some point in our griefwork. We may
lincl ourselves exploring what death means to us
personally, wìrat we fear most about death, and how
we f'eel when we contemplate our owu death. Clearly,
these kinds of questions put us in touch with a
personal philosophy of death as well as of lile.8
Our religious l'aith can be ¿ì great source of
strength during griefwork, and through grief'we can
nurture our l'aith and grow stronger in hope and love.
Prayer, meditation upon the source and meaning o1'
life, worship, praise, ancì reading scripture can ease
the burclen of grief and bring understanding and
peace to a troubled soul. We come to realize that we
neerl not carry our pain alone; rather, it is when we
are stripped of everything we hold clear f,hat we begin
to comprehencl what is meant by, "God is with me."

Our anxiety is lessened, and we can go about the
necessary grief work with renewed courage.
Conelusio¡l

[Jnfortunately, of all the important things we learn
to prepare for in life, griefwork is not one of them.
We learn about griel only through our personal
t5
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ercoutrters with loss. Accordingly, our grief-work is
made more difficult by suppressing the topic of
death, by avoiding discussions with the dying, and by
believing (or choosing to believe) that we will never

be required to face such an ordeal. Our society
operates on this assumption: grief, after all, is a
natural response to loss which will be experienced
sooner or later; and it is not particularly worthwhile
or pleasant to delve into the subject until necessary.
Such an attitude only serves to further deny the
subject oi death and the role of grief as integral
aspects of living.

Death and grief are common

to oul

We wrestle with the pain, with the anger, with the
memories, with the stress, with the depression, with
the changes. We feel, we remember, we learn, and we
grow through grief.

-/t4l$lON
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Author's no[e: A par-Lìcularly hcl¡rful tcaching aid in thc a¡ea oi'
cleath, clying, and grieving is the Iive-part film stli¡r/ta¡te serics by
ìlobert Myrstad, Richarci l{eagan, and Margaret'fhonrpson,
"Dcath and Dying: Closing the Circle" (New Yolk: Cuidance
Associates, 1915,1977). I rvish to acknorvledge clc¡rcndcnce o1'this
lccture on thal series.

'Cf. Melba Colgrovc, Harolci H, Illoomfield, ancl

Peter

McWilliams, Hoxt [o Survive the Loss of ø Love (New YoIk:

human

experience; the time comes when we are forced to
acknowledge these realities.
Griefwork is the hardest work that we will ever be
called upon to do. Yet, it is necessary to the physical,
ernotional, social, and spiritual aspects of our being
to attend to the tasks inherent in grief. In so doing,
we free ourselves from bondage to the deceased and
we establish new patterns of interaction for our lives.

Ilantam Books, 1976).
'lllich Lindemann, "Syrnptomatology and Managernent of' Acute
Grief ," The Attrcrit'an Journal o.l'P,sychialry, Cl (1944), l4l-148.
t
II)id.
¡Myrstad, I{eagan, ancl'lhom¡rson, "Clief ."
'l,inclemann, o7:. cil.
oColgrove Bloourfield, and McWilliams, pp. l0-14
,
'Myrstad, Reagan, and Thompson, "Beleavement."
'Shneidman, Edwin, in consultation with Edwìn Parker and (ì.

Roy Funkhouser', "Yon and Deatli: A Questionnaire,"

Psychology Today, lY (August, 1970), 6'7 -l |
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IS GOD
YOTJR SECURITY BLAT{KET?

"God is not the figment of our escapist imaginations, an oillusion' rnanwføctured
by aur unconscious need to escape reølity; ke eomes showing us realitJ)
- often
pøínful reelity."
By

BILL LOVE

f s t joined the

people lying

on

their

-ñ1, stomachs, a powerful idea took hold: "No
one is with me. No one can keep me safe. There
is no one who won't ever leave me alone."

In

fhese words Gail Sheehy clescribed how the

Ilill Love
'l"cxas.

l6

is pulpit ministcr for the Bering Drive Church

ofChrist, l{ouston,

midlife crises first eame tumbling in upon her" In
Northern lreland on assignment for a magazine, she
was talking with a young man one clay when gunfire
erupted, the young man's face was blown away, ancl
he fell dead into her arms. She realized as never
before that she was mortal. In the ensuing days her
whole outlook changed, She saw more clearly than
ever before that her time was limited, that if she
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wanted to accornplish the goals she had set for herself
she would have to get at it. (Pussa¡¡es, pp. 2-5)
Sheehy put her finger on that personal crisis each
of us must face, whether it comes to us in midlife or

before: the knowledge that no other person can
underwrite my life, the realization that time is

slipping away, tlle brutal awakening to the fact that I
alone am responsible for what I rnake of my life.
Sheehy's book is helpful; we need to know that this
crisis is a comrrron human experience. But her words
also provide a challenge for us as Christians: "No
Thele is no one who wott't ever
one is with me .

alone." Did not Jesus face the forsakenness
of the cross so that we might pray, "Our Fathel who
art in heaverr . . "? Are we ultimately alone,
orphaned in the wolld?
leave me

I
Eric Fromm points out in his book, The Art of
Loving, that we should ask ourselves whether calling
someone "father" is psychologically healthy for us.
Perhaps we should go back past Fromm to the classic
statement of this question in Sigmund Freud's book,

The þ-uture of An Illusion, published in 1927. His
main thesis was that mankind had used religion long
enough as an escape from reality, used "God" too
long as a security blanket; that it was high time that
we grow up and face life as adults.
According to Freud, the invention of a "heavenly

father" is perfectly understandable from

à

psychological point of view. The development of the

human race, Freud thought, is reenacted in the
development of every individual. The mother in the
home is the child's first bulfer against the world;
later the father becomes the image of strength and
provision. When we grow up and leave home,
enjoying no longer the protection and provision of
our parents, we yearn for the lost security and
therefore invent a "heavenly father." The purpose of

"Our first response to Freud's observatian
is the honest admissian that the Christian
faith is often preeched ønd practíced tn a
wüy which vetards the belíever's
development $s e person""
two-fold: to protect

tìle
believer against the cruelties of nature and fate, and
to mediate between the believer and civilization with
all its rules and restrictions. In short, the gods have
always been the buffers between man and reality.

the gods has always been

Freud's main point rvas that man must move
beyond this infantile stage of dependence lo full
adulthood anel independence. We must educate our
children, not by the escapist superstitions of our

inherited religions, but by scientific truth about

"reality." Whereas religion has promised so much
for so long and has not delivered, science will now
show the way to the full, responsible, and happy life.
When we understand the psychology of, growing
up we shall be able to manage our lives without the
security blanket of religion. Psychology, as any other
science, will be able to correct its theory as it goes
along -- something one can hardly say for religion.
The new hope is for a world regulated by mature and
intelligent adults who understand and apply the
scientific method to all of life's problems. Freud
concludes: "No, science is no illusion. But it would
be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere
else what it cannot give us. ' '
Is Freud right? Is God a security blanket for
adults? I)o we program our children for neurosis by
handing on our religion? Are those who are reared
without religious training better able to cope with
Iife? Should we grow up and learn to face life as
adults, without leligion?

II
We freely admit that religion is often used in an
unhealthy way to escape the realities of life. The
believer who denies the death of a child, smothering

natural grief by "iurning it over to the Lord," is
in religious escapism. One is an escapist
when he or she searches for a verse of scripture to
answer every ethical decision in life. Many simple
religious formulas belie the same kind of wish to be
children again: "Be good, go to church, and God
will never let anything bad happen to you." The
Christian who refuses to work, or to vote, or to
participate in community affairs because he is a
"citizen of another kingdom," is using God as his
security blanket. Freud was correct: religion is often
used as an infantile escape from reality.
To say that allreligion is escapist is quite another
matter. The father of modern psychcllogy was not
very "scientific" in his broad generalizations about
religion. He made no distinctions between the many
kinds of religion practiced in the worlel. Vy'e ministers
often make the same mistake when we speak of "the
psychologists" as if they were all the same. 'T'oday's
psychologisfs have various opinions, for example,
about the work of Sigmund Freud. None would take
his theory wholesale without modifications.
Obviously one can observe, both in psychology and
in religion, healthy and unhealthy views of life. Every
counselor knows how treacherously easy it is to
become a parent-figure for persons who refuse to
face the reality of their own lives"
Our first response to Freud's observation is the
honest admission that the Christian faith is often
preached and practiced in a way which retards the
indulging

believer's development as a person.
t7
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Admitting that Freud was correct in saying that
religion can become an unhealthy throrv-back to the
days of childhood, the question remains whether his
vision of a moral society regulatecl solely by scientific
principles has ¡ranned out. The jury is i¡r now after
fifty full years of experience. The western world has
become more and more a civilizatìon rvithout
reference to God, a society controlled by educated
people who are predominantly secular in outlclok.
What can we say about the last fifty years? FIas
Freuci's dream come tt'uc, or is it corning truc?
Developments in thc last half century have
established no necessary connection between
education and "civilization." We must not conl'use

"While Freud wss correct in observing that
religion is often ün instrument of evil, we
must also see that his confidence in science
and educatíon as guerilntors o.f $.iu,st societJ)
wes too ideaListic""
sophistication with morality: improvement in table
manners and increased appreciation of the arts ale
not synonymous with growth in social responsibility.
The record shows clearly that education is a double-

edged

sword: it can be a

blessing

or a

cursc

depending upon the intentions and the ethics of the
educated. Richard Niebuhr observed that there were
rnore highly educated people in Germany before
World War Il than in any comparable society in

history. In spite of that, all of the sciences, bofl.t
physical and social, were made to serve the demonic
dreams of Adolf Hitler.
When an attempt is made upon the President's life
we find small comfort in the fact that the episode can
be replayed in living color on three networks within
the hour; we are not convinced when a sophisticated
John Chancellor says that "there is nothing wrong
with the Alnerican soul," or when the politically
astute .Iohn Connally asserts that violence in America
is not indigenous with us but imported from abroad.
While Frer.ld was correct in observing that religion is
often an instrument of evil, we must also see that his
confidence in science and education as guarantors of
a just socicty was too idealistic, As Reinhold Niebuhr
often said: education does not automatically make
us more moral, but it cloes make us more elfective in
getting what we want.
Our greatest advances in technology have brought

sotne serious side effects. Like the coyote

in

the

Roaclrunner cartoons, some of our brightest ideas
have boomeranged to do us in. The invention of the

automobile is

a prime example. Who coulcl

have

dreamed that Henry Forcl's gasoline buggy woulcl
have revolutionized our American way ol life as it
1B

did? 'Ihe clevelopment of'an aflordable automobile:
changed the dating paltents of'our young people,
extencled the reach of our salesmen into the remotest
parts of' tl.ìe country, stirnulated tl-rc development ol
the oil industry, determined the grorvth patterns o1'
our cities, and increased our elf iciency in rnaking
war. While we would not live without our cars, we
are now finding it more and more dil'ficult to live
with them. Autornobiles consume a signif icant share
ol'our enetgy, pollute our air, jangle our nerves, take

it

a sizeable bite out of our lamily

budgets, and

increase our cleath rate. The government's continuing

concern 1'or the Chrysler Corporaticln shows how
mucl"r our whole economy is llow tied to the
automobile inclustry.
What is the point? That technology is evil? No, the
point is that technology is nol- necessarily good.
Freud was wrong in assuming that an enlightened
society would automatically be a wise, ha¡:py, and
moral society. Many other examples could be given

to clemonstrate the fact that technology is I'lo
unmixed blessing. A computer can be both a
wonderful tool ancl an exasperating problern. We
continue to debate whether nnclear energy can bc clefar"rged ancl safely used to light our cities.
We should see now what Freud, and many of the
brightest visionaries of his day, did not see: that
advances in science, education, ald psychology do

not automalically bring with them the growth

in

moral jurigment necessary for their construetive use.
Vy'e are outside o{'the realm of science when we ask
by what means mankind will gain the cthical

perspective needed to use its knowledge of the
universe for the common good. Perhalrs we are now
ready to ask what kind of religion makes a significant
contribution to the wellare of both the individual atd
the society as a whole.

IV
In contrast to Freud's judgment that all religion is
regression into an unhealthy state of childish
depenelence, we Christians believe that our faith in
the heavenly lìather promotes growth towarcl i\rll ancl
res¡ronsible aclulthoocl , The difl'erence lics in the kincl
of F'ather we have encounterecl in Jesus Christ"
ln Jesus we corne 1.o know our lìather, not because
n'út¿þ"

fit¿tker ds o¡*¡' üfi!.jt fu¿1ps üntf secui"íty,
hut he ¡s ma¡t ûur securítJt bktnÍtet""
know him beeause of our psychological needs; we
know hirn because he has come to us again and again

in history: in the exodus, in the prophets, and
rrltimaLely in Jesus Chríst. lJe is not the figrnent

o1'

our escapist imaginations, au "illusion"
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manufacturecl by our unconscious need to escape
reality; he comes showing us reality
often painful
reality.

-

'Ihe lìather we meet in Jesus Christ does not shielcl
us lrom suffering; he suffers with us. This Father did
not send his Son as a kind of divine sportscaster who,

having never played the game himse lf , sits
comfortably above the fray making perceptive
comments. He became one of us in every way: he
laughed as we laugh, he cried as we cry, he suffered
as we suffer, and he died as we die. ln his Son our

Father walks with ns into the darkest valleys ol'
human suffering; in the resurrection of his Son he
leads us out on the other side in victory over life's
bittelest realities.
In Jesus, our Father shows us how to iive and serve
in the real world. In Jesus' parable of the Good
Samalitan, for example, we can learn much about

the world and the possibilities for improving it.
Careful study of this parable can save us from that

childish and sentimental view of life which makes us
vulnerable to disillusionment and bitterness. We
discover, first of all, that this is a "fallen" world
where some people will take advantage of and abuse
others. We can see also that stopping to help others
can be risky business. The Cood Samaritan stands to
lose much: his valuable tirne, his rroney, his peace ol
mind, and perhaps even his own life. Jesus shows us

in this parable that, if one cannot bind u¡: the wouncls
of the whole world, he can at least help the person in
his road
not an insignificant truth il'you happen
to be the- one bleeding beside the road. The Coocl
Samaritan also teaches us that loving means more

than sympathy, more than analysìs and
discussion
loving means doing and giving, At the
- story
end of the
Jesus calls us to apply these
"Co and do something
like this." In Jesus Christ we meet a Father who
continually insists that we grow up and live
principles as mature adults,

responsibly in the real world.

Like Freud, some of us Christians seern never to
have met the heavenly Father who came to us in Jesus
Christ, He is not here to do our bidding; we are here

to do his wiil. Our comfort is not his

primary

concern; his prirnary concern is our welfare. He is
no indulgent parent who is blind to his children's
selfishness; he calls us to share in the world's
suffering, to serve, even to give ourselves completely
in serving. In discipleship to his Son, our Father leads
us through service and suffering to the final victory

of his kingdom. If we see that our Father will not
allow us to remain forever children, we should also
see that he will not let us walk alone
orphaned in

-

the world. Our Father is our only hope and security,
but he is nol our security blanket.
ldl$ÐN

By Bobbåe Lee F{olley
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The Women Said Yes (Þ'awcett Crest Book,
ã tq7Á $1.95, paper) Jessamyn Vy'est quotes from
her early journal what seems almost a premonitory

entry:

For thousands of years people have been
eonfronted by the necessity of dying.
lnnumerable persons have had to watch a death
approach slowly. 'Ihey have had to recognize

that the very body which contained, fold on
fold, the elements of their personality has
turned against itself. Yet in spite of the problem
being nof only universal but immemorial, little
has been written on the subject. Vy'e have
bookshelves filled with tomes telling us how to
aehieve or endure puberty, marriage, motherhood, and what is known as "the chango of
life." tsut have no handy guides to dying. . . .

t9
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Of the many who have walked to that black
gate, a few have touched

funerals. Persons "pass away," "go to sleep,"
wither and fade as flowers, perish, or become
deceased. DEAD is "the new four-letter word of

it, then for one reason

or another returned. Let them advise us. What

will give us the greatest comfort on our trip

pornography" (Concerning Death, p. xi).
Moreover, death has become political.

down that bleak road? Are there vantage points
from which we can have backward glances to
the sunlit land we have left behind? Or best
keep steadily on? Are there shortcuts? And
what of them? If the journey proves too
painful, should we take them? Are we I'ools to
plod on? Ol are such shortcuts, like many
others, not time-savers in the long run?

þp.

Medicare, increased Social Security, nursing
programs, emerging terminal hospital facilities,

modern medical technology, and llew

techniques for the utilization of body parts all
suggest new attitudes toward dying and death

3a-35)

Two years later Jessamyn's doctor held up an x-ray
for her mother to see: "We find here irregular

infiltration throughout the upper and medical
portion of both lungs, with cavitation in the apical
portions of both lungs. 'Ihe findings are those of a
far advanced bilateral tuberculosis with considerable
fibroid reaction" (pp, 36-37). Nor to fool mother
Grace: her daughter had consumption. The shadows
of death seemed nearer and nearer as Jessamyn
wasted away in the sanitorium. Doctors and nurses
held themselves aloof. And there was no light to
illuminate the path.
Many years later Robert Fulton wrote, in his essay
"On the Dying of Death" (in Explctining l)eafh to
Children, editcd by Earl A. Grollman, Beacon Press,
1967, $5,95), that there is "a very significant change
taking place in contemporary American society. This
change, thus lar, has been basically attitudinal in

nature; whereas death was once regarded

as

inevitable, it is now coming to be viewecl as avoidable
if not, indeed, unnecessaly. Death, as it has been
traditionally defined, is dying" (p. 31). He, as many
others, points out that death is often treated as no
rnore than a physical stigma: maybe some won't have
to die at all what with freezing bodies and other such
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'5 'Whereas deøth wos once regørded øs
inevitable, it ís now coming to be viewed as
avoidahle íf not, incleed, unnecessary. u "
study, death is no longer "viewed as a pervasive
factor of life but as a rare, impersonal, virtually
abnormal event" (in "lntroduction" to Concerning
Death: A Practical Guide .for the Living, edited by
Earl A. Grollman, Beacon Press, 1974, $5.95, p. xii).

The aging and dying are isolated into "senior
citizens' homes" or retirement communities or
nursing hornes: growing old, in short, has become
institutionalized. Griel' is diminisheel and hidclen"
Euphemisms cover the reality as artificial turf and
plastic clods cover the real earth of the cemetery.
Indeed, in at least one famous cemetery, musie is

piped into the vaults. Memorial services replace
20

as well as ways of coping with life different
from what we have ever known before. (Fulton,
in Explaining Death, p.36)

The development of highly technical machines, such
as the kidney machine and the scanners; wide-spread
abortion with political implications and legal
ramifications; the doctors' dilemma in deciding
whether to pull the plug, or indeed whether to
connect the plug in the first place, suggest that "some
men have a greater claim to life than others." At the
time of Fulton's writing, a "Life and Death
Committee" had established "that one's right to a
life-sustaining machine is a function of his potential
or actual coutribution to society" (p. 34).
In addition, the cloud of nuclear extermination
hovers over all of us. Robert Jay Lifton and Eric

Olson ¡'Zlvlng and Dying, Bantam Books, 19'74,
$1.95) point out the enormity of the fallout in the
changing attitudes toward death: "The atomic bomtt
does not merely destroy; it destroys the boundaries of'
destruction" (p. 7). As a result of Fliroshima and
Vietnam, killing has become preposterous and
distant: "unseen victims suffering and dying without
ever having met their opponents" (p. 8).
To fathom cleath they ask questions about lif

e

:

What does it mean to face the time of marriage
when divorce is so common and alternative
living arrangements, such as communes and
cohabitation, are so widely exploled? What
does it mean to choose a vocation when all
forms of work, and the idea of work itself, are
so severely criticized? What does it mean to
grow up when adulthoocl implies being locked
into support of a violent, directionless culture?
What does it mean to grow old when old people
are isolated, put off by themselves apart
from family and ongoing community? What
does it mean to die when science has challenged
sacred religious lreliefs and in the place of

spiritual comfort has left only the "scientific
method"? (p. l0)

Life, "cut off {iom traditional sources of meaning . .

.
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appears to holel no eertainties or reliable values', (p. g).

In politicizing,

secularizing, and trivializing life,

we have also rendered death meaningless.

No, Shakespeare, we do not ,,owe God a death."

However, the whole story of life and death is not
contained in these expressions. Existing side by side
with pessimistic and cynical attitudes and fearful
patterns of behavior is a rising movement to bring
death out of the closet, to reinvest it with meaning.
Others had already begun to write about death in a
more realistic way, to study the nature of death and
dying, and to challenge the movement to "squash"

death, However, few would question that it was
Elizabeth-Ktibler Ross's experimental seminar at the
University of Chicago Billings Hospital and the
subsequent publication of Death and Dying, which
describes the seminar and the amazing outcomes of
it, that gave the impetus. Ãs Time reported, "The
Chicago seminar has vanquished the conspiracy of
silence that once shrouded the hospital's terminal
wards. lt has brought death out of the darkness. In
so doing, it has shown how, and with what quiet
grace, the human spirit composes itself for
extinction." Amid much opposition and belligerence
from medical personnel, Ki.ibler-Ross went to the
dying and let them tell their stories-stories to which
no one had bothered to listen before.

Subsequently, books, lectures, symposia,
interviews, television programs, and movies abouf
death have proliferated. Thanatology sociefies have

arisen. Death has now become almost a fad.
Nevertheless, out of this awakening interest have
come helpful and informative books that have guided

many through the confusion, sharpened our
sensitivities, and offered practical help for

confronting death and helping the dying and grieving.

They have been written by every kind of
professional: doctors, sociologists, anthropologists,

"As ü result of Ítriroshìmæ snel Yietnam,
killing has become preposterous snd distant:
'unseen víctíms sufferíng ønd dyíng wíthout

r:yþw"r*!"r::rg::xtri:--

psychiatrists, ministers, philosophers. Many of thbse
that touch the deepcr places have been written by the
dying or by those who have livecl with the clying,
those who have lost a loved one in death. There are
surely no "handy guides to dying," but there are
thoughtful persons who, from their own experiences,
study, and eontemplation, are sincerely frying to

illuminate the path.

The books and essays diseussed in this
review-some old and some new; some seholarly and
some practical"-give an overview or broad
perspective on the phenomenon and a framework on

which to hang our thoughts concerning death; or
they are anthologies that build, through the
particularity of specific problems and more limited
studies, the resources for confronting "fundamental
and inevitable questions before tragedy comes. " Two
other companion essays will appear in later ìssues of
Mission Journal. One will consider books dealing
with very personal aspects of the death experience;
the other will reflect upon life after death.
The Furitan Way of Ðeath

Wherever you are in your understanding or
experience of death and whatever your theological
predispositions (and if, indeed, you are interested in
probing more deeply into the subject), you will be

richly informed by David Stannard's The PuriÍan
Way of Deatå (Oxforcl University Press, 1977, $3.95,
"a study in religion, culture, and social

paper):

change.

'

' Stannard draws heavily but with

compelling clarity and caution from diverse and
complex materials in the disciplines of history,
sociology, anthropology, theology, and literature,
He puts them all together in a very creative and
original way. While maintaining a scholarly

approach, he manages to be both highly readable and
fascinating. He himself classifies the work as an
essay: "a work designed to open a fieid of

inquiry to questions rather than one claiming to
dictate answers. 'Ihe focus is on the human Çoncern
with death. The Puritans of New England are the
people chosen to serve as exemplars of this concern"
(p, vii).
Several basic concepts underlie Stannard's study:
(l) As Freud had pointed out earlier, o'at

bottom no

one believes in his own death, or, to put the same
thing in another way, in the unconseious every one of
us is convinced of his own immortality" (quoted by
Stannard, p. 4). This inability creates an inevitable
inconsistency in our ideas of death. Since we cannot
live very well with "contradiction and uncertainty,"
we try to resolve it. It is this "fundamental clilemma,
eoupled with various forms of its imaginative
resolution, that is the cornerstone c;f this trook on
Puritan America" (p. 4).
(2) "The Furitans of New England lived life and . . .
faced death with an intensity virtually unknown in
modern American life" (p. ix).
(3) "The behavior of a people in thc face of dyirrg
is the result of their aftitude towarcl, and their vision
of, eleath" (p. 9). Using the framework of Clifford
Geertz's ethos and world view, Stannarel emphasizes
throughout the book that behavior changes as l¡elief
changes and that a part of the great tension
experieneed by the Puritans had its origin in thc
conf'lict between the two.
?I

MIS,\ION JOUÌlNAL

Religious belief and ritual confront and
mutually confirm one another; the ethos is
made intellectually reasonable by being shown
to represent a way of life implied by the actual
state of affairs which the world-view describes,

and the world-view is made emotionally

acceptable by being presented as an image of an

actual state of affairs of which such a way of
life is an authentic expression.
(p, 10, quoted from Geertz, "Ethos, V/orldView and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols,"
The Antioch Review 17 [Winter 1957-58], 421-22)

"ln

short, the two phenomena, ethos (in the present
of dying) and world view

case, the prescribed 'way'

(the vision or concept of death) reinforce

one

another, and thus fused, give meaning, order, and
stability to their cultural source" (p. l0).

(4) The way the Puritan handled death is

"world view" and
of
their perceived
realities
consequent
"the
cosmological and physical environment" are
defined. However, Stannard is not interested in
"abstract ideology." While it is true that "death had
for [the Puritans] enormously complex metaphysical
meaning; . . it was also shaped by the physical
texture of their everyday, ever-present reality" (p.
3l). And the reality was grim.
Stannard sets the stage for the discussion of the
Puritan way by briefly sketching the history of death
customs and world views, especially emphasizing
those elements that in some form later found a place
in the complex Puritan outlook. Eventually these

understandable only when their

ideas caused great tension and contradictions that, in

the nature of social change, had to be resolved. At

one time, most notably behind the force of
Augustine's powerful writings, "most of these
"Even Cotton Mather, the noted Purìtan
minister wh¡¡ coulcl preüch damnation even
ta small chìldren, somet¡mes spoke of the
beøuty of the soul's fliçht to heaven that
'should make the tselíever long for death"' "
tensions and contradictions were subdued, if not
resolved" (p. 13), Theoretically, at least, ethos and
world view were fused in a way that held until the
time of the Reformation and the "restoration" aims
of the Puritans.
Understanding the world of the New England
Puritan, and something of the Old World from
whieh he had fTed, is essential for understanding the
beliefs and behavior concerning death and the radical

sixteenth century had effected" (p. 31), those who
came to the New World came to find "refuge for the
holiest remnant of God's people" (p. 40). They
believed it their divinely appointed mission "to lye in
wait in the wilderness" and "to come upon the backs
of Gods Enemies witl-r deadly Fastings and Frayer"
(p. 96, quoted from William Hooke). It was not a
retreat but a "flank attack" and they would return in

triumph.

To understand their fears, one must understand

the all-pervading nature of their belief in

predestination. Stannard provides excellent insights
into this doctrine and its practical issue in their lives.
Despite constant self-examination, penitence,
sermons filled with horror, and grim warnings, "there
was no way in this world of knowing with certainty
whether one was saved or not. " Adult anxieties were
the outgrowth of childhood terrors, for they were
taught of their depravity from the earliest possible
moment and filled with guilt by ministers who urged
them to a godly life while at the same time giving
little credence to childhood conversions.
However, alongside this all-consuming fear

engendered

by their

religious doctrines and

experience, they still retained a rhetoric of hope from
their religious past: death as an outlet from sin and

misery and an inlet to Glory. Even Cotton Mather,

the noted Puritan minister who could preach
damnation even to small children, sometimes spoke
of the beauty of the soul's flight to heaven that
" should make the Believer long for death. "
The ultimate difficulty lay . . . in the attempt to

reconcile the differences represented by these
two contradictory "banners" that they carried

simultaneously. . . . The enduring discomfort
thèy experienced was principally due to their

failure to credibly reconcile the answers they
were forced to give to questions concerning the
proper way of viewing death with those
problems imposed by the experience of dying

(p.el).
The result was a "vision of death and an attitude
toward dying that were locked in perpetual conflict"
(p. 95). Theories of social change indicate that
neither persons nor societies can live in such
contradiction.
When the Puritans came to power in England,
many of the better educated went back, believing that
it was the beginning of the exodus back to the
homeland*in victory. However, with the end of
England's Civil War came a spirit of tolerance in

group of

religion that was completely unaeeeptable to the New
England Puritans. Their vision was demolished. The

idealists who were not satisfied with the "incomplete
break with Rome that the Anglican Church of the

structure (world view) was changing all about them,

ehange

i)

that eventually took place.

A

Second Coming

had not arrived. While

social

AUGUSl',

their culture (ethos) became exaggerated: "never had

the concern with death taken on in England the
enormous and complex meanings it soon would in
those infant settlements across the Atlantic'' (p. 97)
Their beliefs concerning man's place in the
universe and his fate led directly to their funerary
practices but these were essentially those that had
been in effect in England for everyone: immediate
burial of the corpse, no ceremony, no prayers, no
b_ells,.no embalming, no artificial forms of grieving
.

" 'Na testimony wøs more eloquent
than the unkemp\ overgrown, occasíonally
bone-littered cemeteries of that era, studded
wíth grøvestones depìcting an optimistic and
sentímentalized vision of the afterlífe. ' "
such as the wearing of black, no grave markers. The
Puritans who came to the New \ù/orld were just as

zealous and just as antagonistic to burial ritual,
grieving props, and grave markers as they had been

in England. But only for a time.
"Long before the seventeenth century was to draw
to a close, the funerals of New England Puritans
would take on trappings expensive and elaborate
enough to have shocked and astounded the departed
ancestors in the old country" (p. I l0). Most
important of all, funeral services became religious
services. The funeral sermon was not limited to the

former "scriptural exegesis" but given to

much

"eulogizing." Iconography avoided any imagery that
was suggestive of papism, "but whatever the specific
imagery of the moment may have been, it is here, in
the iconography, that the difference between
death in Puritan England and Puritan New England
can be most clearly seen" (p. I 16). But wHy?
It is at this point that Stannard's scholarship is
informed by various social and anthropological
theories in the attempt to show why the New England
Puritans departed so radically from the rituals in
\vays their forebears would have found
inexplicable-and, indeed, as a result of what ha<l
happened in England. They had become a people
alone. "Vy'hat they encountereeJ was themselves and
their profound sense of tribal vulnerability" (p. 122).
The foundations were crumbling under them.
Their funeral sermons are replete with great grief
over the loss of their founding fathers and the impact
that death had upon their community. The pain of
separation was intense because it was disruptive to
their social order. For them there was a vital
eonneetion with the death of the leaders and
"intimations of God's disapproval of the state of
affairs" among them. As in other unstable societies
or periods of instability, customs and rituals became
very extravagant.
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As a culture they had no other choice; the dayto-day world in which they were living imposed
on them difficulties not encountered by their

in England, difficulties that
a different response. ln time the
problems . . . would become so overwhelming
that the Puritan culture would succumb to
predecessors
necessitated

them. (pp. 133-134)
Social structure was changing but culture was not.
Puritans were trying to restore their past, but they
were also trying to plant "seeds of a rejuvenated
sense of mission. There were new expectations of the
millenium. The Great Awakening brought renewed
hope for a while but proved to be only the shuddering
of a dying culture: "the traditional r.vorld of the
Puritan was rapidly passing into history. And with it
was passing the Puritan way of death" (p. 147).
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, "New
England Puritans recognized the signs everywhere:
something was terribly wrong in the Bible
Commonwealth, and those who remained in the
Puritan fold were aware of little they could do to
cope with it" (p. 162). Power and influence and
cohesion waned "in a milieu of mounting worldliness
and against the background of the rising power and
influence of non-Puritan forces" (p. 162).

In death, as in life, Puritan culture had lost its
grip .
. No testimony was more eloquent,
incongruous though it may seem, than the
unkempt, overgrown, occasionally bonelittered cemeteries of that era, studded with
gravestones clepicting an optimistic and
sentimentalized vision of the afterlife. (p. 160)
The balance of ethos and world view had changed
again.
In the final chapter, Stannard traces how "a number of interconnected developments in American social

life-all

related in one way or another to a fading
of community purpose and to changes that had
begun to beset the world of the Puritan before the
middle of the eighteenth century-contributed to the
sense

emergence

of new attitucles to death and dying" (p.

l88). As others, Stannard also

sees death avoidance,

denial, alienation, and the unimportance of the
individual as characteristic of twentieth-century
America. It is deeply disturbing to him that "except
in the most intimate of relationships, few men or
women can ever regard themselves or anyone else as
truly unique and irreplaceable" (p. 190). If people
are so unimportant, then death cfoes not matter.
F{e concludes: "the very vividness of the Furitan

experience can help to highlight our understanding of
the interconnecting currents of the problem of death
for all mankind*from the very distant past to the
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prcscrrt antl Iìrt urt"' lp. l 9ti).
One revicrve ¡ captr,rrecl thc signif icancc' ol' 'ïlte l:)urilan l4/a,y o./ Deorh in one wo¡cl: a l¡ellwelher

book.

lithical Issues

['or urany in trventieth-oentury Amerìca, howevcr, thele is conflict with thc generally accepted
nlodern views. Perhaps some arlìorlg the cr)lts and m<lre fundaÌnental rcligious glou¡ts--bciug
neither in lhe world nor ol it-find themselves very much in the posil.ion o1'the Pulitans. Others
remain in the world seeking cleeper meanings l'or life and dcath and theleby bring dignity,
ol these.
Ethicul Issue¡'in DcaÍh and Dyint (edited by Robert F. Weir, Columbia Unìversity Prcss,
1977) is a collection of articles bringing together lhe critical thought of persons traincd in

respect, ancl signilicance to troth. We call attentiotì hcre to some

mcdicine, law, ancl ethics. 'l'he complex decisions involved in tlre contem¡ror ary way of dcatli and
dying can no longer lie in the province of one profession only, for they cross "tladitional
disciplinary and professional lines." Indeed, thc persons rvhose lives are in questiot.t arc asscrtinB
lllcil own stakc in thc crrtcr¡rrisc.
Questions about truthtelling with f.erminal parients, the applo¡rr-ìate care and lreatment
of patients known to be dying, the rneaning ol death, the ¡:crmissibility 01' withholding
life-sustainingprocedures in the face of cleath, and the justifiability o1'euthanasia and
suicide are not merely procedural (to be decided try physicians) or technical (to be decided
by attorneys and judges). They ¿rre, in addition, questions about the cìecisions ancl conduct
jn the face of death rvhich can be justified on moral grounds. (p. xiii)
The editor begins by recognizing the gcneral ¡rroblems ol lacing death, the cuJrheurisnrs as
evidcnt in the hos¡rital as out, the att.empts to slow thc aging ¡rrocess. He aclnrits that cloctols
Itave the same difficulties-perhaps inl.ensificcl sincc f hey are su¡rposed to be the cnemics of'the
rr.l¡r,ry. But llìey are unmasked in theil inability "to tell temlinal patients the truth about thcir'
condition or to terminatc rvhen fulther lil'e-sustaining attempts are nreaningless" (pp. xi-xii).
One of the purposes of the book is to show lhat these attitudes inhibit leasonable and practical
decision-making. However, ân even greater p'^blem is obvious ñom the wide tange of opinion
among the authors. Each is a respected and highly cornpctent person in his cliscipline ancl has
brought the best of factual ínfolmation and clitical obselvation and thoìight to bear upon the
issues discussed.

The book is divided into f ive sections: 'Iruthtelling, f)etermining Death, Allowing hìlarlts To
Die, Euthanasia, Suicide. Each is an issuc mcdical and/or legal in naturc but also ethical "in that.
it calls f'or crit.ical, systernatic reflection upon moral conduct in a variety of situations involving
life-ancl-death decisions" (p. xiii).
Although all of' the articles in the firsl section are sonìewhat clated, Joseph Iìletchcr's
coutention, in "Medical Diagnosis: Our Right To Kuorv the 'I'r'uth," is one that should be read
by all those who deal with dying persons. He argues cogently "thât without their freecìoni to
choose and theil right to know the tluth, patienl.s are only ¡ruppets." 'I'his right, olì course,
necessitates thc concomitant obligution ol'physicians to tell the t.ruth. ln Iìletcher's view, when
the patient is sinrply an "object of medical tre¿ìtment," and is not told the medical knowledge
thât is his oÌ hers, the pâtient ceases to be a ¡relson, is deprivecl ol lights and responsibilities and,
hence, moral status. And, further, he or slic is deprived of thc opportunity to preparc for clcath.
Other writers in their essays express the lear of what the tn¡lh will do to the paticnt and also the
inability of many doctors to facc the idea oI death themselves.
It secms surprising that nothillg is said in this section of thc work ol Kiibler-Ross and her
interviews with dying patients. While some may disagrec with hcl theology and/or metaphysics,
her seminar rvas a landmark experiment and shed great light on the problems of"'telling" the
patient.
The seconcl section illustrates well "the ilonic tr ick" that Stannard rnentions:
At a time when medical advances have brought about the virtual clinillation o1'the plagues
deâth itsell'has
that clccimated and crippled unlold legìons only shor'l decades ago
again becorle a mystely; physicians cânnot agrec on a simple definition ol'wltat death is ot'
rvhe¡r it occurs; theologians cannot agrce on what, ìf anything, cleath brings in its wake;
and laymen, lelt to solt things out fol themselves in this rvelter of confusion, have no
ah.ernative but to cling to lile and avoid direct conflontatiorl rvith the unknown. (The
Puútan Way of Death, pp. 193-194)
He might have also brought legal aspects into it inasmt¡ch as they havc bcen called into play in
numerous cases recently, e.g., the TuckcÌ case (recounted by Alexander Capron and l-eon Kass
in "A Stât.utory Definition of the S1ândards for I)ctermining Human Deat.hl Au Appraisal ancl a

Proposal"), a situation in which it rvas clainied by the plaintiff that his brothel''s heart was

removed l'or transplanf purposes wit.houl approval of anyone ancl that the operation began
beforc the death of the pcrson. l'hele are pertiuent discussions of'rvhether it. is possiblc to set
fì.rm guidelines for cletermining death and of the part thât the "laity" should have in such matters.
In tlie other sections, argumculs ancl opposing argun]enls are rehearsecl on lhe current
questions of the when's and how's of death and the worth of the infirrn, delormed, and cliseased.
It is clcar that those rvho "should know" clo not really know. It is also clear thaf humanity is the
lot of'¡s all: professionals and laity alike apploach "cleath and dying rvith a mixture of fcar and
fascination. . . ."
Whybothertoreaclsuchabook? Ethical LssuesinDealhandD.yingisoneof the tresf available
collections of reasoned and scholarly ârguments alrout the rnoral ancl ethicâl issues sutrounding
death and dying. While the aul.hols obviously disagree , they c¿ìn nonelheless help those rvho rcacl
to clarify lheir own confusecl concepts and to fornulate a personâl philosophy for dcaling with
these issues. Irurthcrnrore, here is a clea¡ illust.ral.iorì that tlìe decpest qucstions and protrlems ol
life seldom have "black ancl white" answers. But there ate those who are struggling. lrll$ffi\

